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Abstract—This paper presents a Petri net (PN) approach to 
modelling, simulating, and analysing the new protocol we have 
proposed. This new protocol is an enhanced authentication 
scheme based on a biometric verification mechanism and identity 
based cryptography. A formal approach like Petri nets allows one 
to represent cryptographic protocols. For the sake of simplicity, a 
complex PN model will not be discussed in this paper until all 
attacks are demonstrated and the model proved to be secure. 
This paper shows how Petri nets are used to model, analyse and 
detect flaws in our new protocol. First, our proposed protocol is 
modelled without an adversary, and then a generic adversary 
model is added to examine all possible adversary behaviours. 
Finally we demonstrate how Petri nets can be used to analyse 
security threats such as man-in-the-middle attack, reflection 
attack, and parallel session attack on this protocol.  
Keywords- identity-based cryptosystem; biometrics; security 
analysis; cryptographic protocol; Petri nets.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the unique characteristics possessed by 
cryptographic protocols, analysis and evaluation tend to be 
more difficult than normal protocols. Typically cryptographic 
protocols, also known as security protocols, tend to inhabit a 
complex environment by utilising various cryptographic 
mechanisms, such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, 
hash functions, timestamps, and digital signature [1]. For this 
reason, Petri nets offer the opportunity to conduct an in-depth 
analysis and overcome security vulnerabilities and weaknesses. 
Moreover, they simplify the modelling of exchange messages 
between nodes and describe behaviour of authentication and 
key agreement procedure.  A number of researchers have used 
Petri nets to model and analyse cryptographic protocols [2 -6].  
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2, we briefly review previous works on Petri nets and 
our new protocol. In Section 3, we model the client-server 
trust model using PN. In Section 4, we add the adversary 
entity to the trust model and simulate various attacks using 
PN. We then provide a brief discussion on security analysis in 
Section 5. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 6. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
A. Petri Nets 
The concept of the Petri net [7] was introduced in 1962 by 
Carl Adam Petri [8]. Petri nets are graphical diagrammatic tools 
based on strong mathematical foundations. It is used as a visual 
communication aid to model concurrency, synchronisation, 
limited resources, sequentially, mutual exclusion and behaviour 
in distributed systems [9-11]. A Petri net is defined as a bipartite 
directed, weighted graph with two types of nodes called places 
and transitions, linked by directed arcs. In other words, a Petri 
net must consist of the following components [9-11]: 
§ A set of places (drawn as circles in the graphical 
representation), represent conditions and possible states 
of the system.  
§ A set of transitions (drawn as rectangles or thick bars), 
represent a change of state which caused by events or 
actions 
§ A set of arcs (drawn as arrows), connecting a place to 
transition and vice versa. 
§ Tokens (drawn as black dots), occupy places to 
represent the truth of the associated condition. 
 
The formal definition of a Petri net is shown in Table 1 [10]. 
Generally Petri nets focus on specific properties such as 
liveness, deadlock, livelock, boundedness and safeness [9-11]. 
 
 Table 1. Formal Definition of a Petri Net 
A Petri net is 5-tuple, PN=(P,T,F,W,M0) where: 
P={p1, p2,…,pm} is a finite set of places, 
T={t1,t2,…,tn} is a finite set of transitions, 
F  (P X T) U (T X P) is a set of arcs (flow 
relations), 
W: F à {1, 2, 3,…} is a weight function, 
M0: P à {0, 1, 2, 3,….} is the initial marking, 
P ∩ T= ø and P U T ≠ ø. 
 
A Petri net structure N=(P, T, F, W) without any specific initial 
marking is denoted by N. 
 
A Petri net with the given initial marking is denoted by (N, M0). 
 
Petri nets are used in this paper to ensure the soundness of 
the protocol analysis. This approach is a very useful tool for 
modelling and simulating a range of possible attacks on the 
proposed protocol. The key features of using Petri nets can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The ability to model the concurrency of the protocol 
progress with tokens 
2. The ability to model intermediate and final objectives as 
places 
 3. The ability to model transitions as commands and inputs 
 
B. Review of Proposed Protocl 
In our previous work [12], we have developed a new 
authentication protocol that allows remote mutual 
authentication with key agreement. Our new protocol is based 





































     
Moreover, the new protocol is aimed to initiate secure 
authentication and communication between the client and 
server by building a robust mechanism between 
communicating parties The proposed protocol may be 
described as a two-factor user authentication mechanism and 
three-way handshake procedure to establish a reliable 
connection and ensure secure data sharing. Our new protocol 
consists of four phases: system initialising phase, registration 
phase, login phase, and authentication phase. The new protocol 
is summarised in Fig. 1 and the notations used for the new 











































Client Ci  Registration Centre Ri 







(3) IDCi, H4(.), Enc{}a/Dec{ }a, 
fi, ei, τ, Pr_K Ci 
(2) Computes:  
• fi = H4(Bioci) 
• ei = H4(IDci||y)⊕H4(PWCi||fi) 







Client Ci  Server Si 
(1) Enters ID’ Ci  and PW’Ci  
 




• z’i = H4(PWCi ||fi) 
• M1=ei⊕z’i 
• W1=r Ci . P 
• M2= r Ci . Pr_K Ci 
• M3= M1⊕rci 














(6) C1=Enc{IDCi, TCi, W1, M3, 
MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1 ,M3)}a 
 
(2)Verifies the authenticity of ID’Ci and 
PW’Ci 
  
(4) Verifies  
 Accept if d(BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
) < τ 
  Reject if d(BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
)  ≥ τ 
 






























(5) Decrypts C2 and verifies M7 ?= 
H4(M4||rCi) and the integrity of MACk(IDCi, 
TSi, W2, M6,M7) 
Server Si is authenticated 
(6) Computes: 
• KCi =rCi . W2 
• Sk = H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi, W1, W2, KCi)  
• M8=M6⊕M1 =rSi 














(4) C2=Enc{IDCi, TSi,W2, M6, 










 (7) C3= Enc{M9, MACk(M9)}a 
(1) Decrypts C1, then checks validity of IDci 




• k=H2(IDCi, TCi, W1, M2) 




• W2=rSi .P 
• KSi=rSi.W1 
• Sk=H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi W1, W2, KSi)  
• M5=M3⊕M4 = rCi 
• M6=M4 ⊕ rSi 












(8) Decrypts C3 and verifies M9?= 
H4(M6⊕rSi) 
Client Ci is authenticated 
Figure 1. The new proposed protocol 
  
 
TABLE 2. NOTATIONS USED IN THE NEW PROTOCOL 
 
Symbol Definition 
Ci User/Client /Computer 
Si Server 
Ri Registration Centre 
IDSi Identity of Server 
IDCi Identity of user C 
PWCi User’s password  
BioCi Biometric template of C 
Pub_K Public Key 
Pr_K Private Key 
|| Message concatenation operation 
P A point on elliptic curve E with order n 
xP Denotes point multiplication on elliptic curve  
y A piece of secret information maintained by the server 
(x, Pub_Ks) The server S’s Private/Public key pair, where      
Pub_Ks = xP 
rCi , rSi A random number chosen by the Ci and Si respectively  
H(.) A secure one-way hash function  
MACk(m) The secure message authentication code of m under the 
key k 
 XOR operation 
 
 
We have examined and validated the behaviour of the 
proposed protocol by using finite-state machines and Petri nets 
[14]. The following steps explain the methodology to model 
the proposed protocol with Petri nets: 
1) Build a PN trust model of the trust relationship using 
TAPAAL [15] simulation and verification software. 
The following steps are necessary for the process of 
modelling: 
(a) Define the places and transitions and declare 
their functionalities  
(b)  Implement a token passing scheme once the 
initial marking is set 
(c) Assess the model’s behaviour by examining 
reachability, boundedness, and liveness 
(d) Validate the model using simulation 
 
2) Add the adversary model. This step involves the 
following: 
(a) Extend the original model and define places 
and transitions for the adversary entities 
(b) Implement the token-passing scheme with 
the adversary 
(c) Model different attack and identify any 
insecure behaviour 
 
III. CLIENT-SERVER TRUST MODELLED VIA PN  
The trust model is a notation for determining whom the 
organisations should trust with its assets. For example, 
organisations usually verify the applicants’ resumes and 
references, and conduct background and history checks before 
trusting their employees. Once they are employed, they will be 
issued photo ID badges and parking permits. In contrast to the 
real world, it is challenging in the virtual world to identify 
individuals who are trusted and those who are not. A trust 
relationship between a client and a server can be obtained in 
different practices. Some systems use the traditional way that 
relies on passwords and digital certificates. Sometimes it may 
involve a trusted third party to operate the authentication and 
validation, such as the Kerberos login protocol [1], while other 
systems deploy biometric automated verification systems to 
recognise trusted users. 
In the proposed trust model, the client-server trust 
relationship is initiated during the registration phase. First, the 
client submits his/her ID, password (PWCi), and biometric data 
(BioCi). Then the server will issue in return a corresponding 
private key (Pr_KCi), secret key (a) for the symmetric 
encryption, and τ predetermined threshold for biometric 
verification. The assumption for this model is that the client 
and server are trustable entities, and they never cheat. Timed-
arc Petri Nets are used to model the new protocol. The trust 
model consists of two Petri net entities: one for the client C 
and the other for the server S. The protocol entities are derived 
from the protocol description in [12]. The assumption made 
for this model is that each legitimate participant is honest, i.e. 
behaves according to the protocol rules. The Petri net model in 
Fig. 2 represents the trust model for the proposed protocol. 
The definitions of the places and transitions used in this model 
are illustrated in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. 
 
Table 3. DEFINITIONS OF PLACES FOR THE TRUST MODEL 
Place Definition Place Definition 
P1 Client random number P14 Encrypted SYN/ACK 
P2 Client timestamp P15 Decrypted SYN/ACK 
P3 SYN request P16 Verification message 
P4 Login request P17 Rejected request 
P5 Encrypted login 
request  
P18 Accept request – Server 
is authenticated 
P6 Decrypted login req. P19 Session key 
P7 Verification message P20 ACK 
P8 Rejected request P21 Encrypted ACK 
P9 Accepted request P22 Decrypted ACK 
P10 Server random number P23 Verification message 
P11 Server timestamp P24 Rejected request 
P12 Session Key P25 Accept request – Client  
P13 SYN/ACK  is authenticated 
 
    Table 4. DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS FOR TRUST MODEL 
Trans. Definition Trans. Definition 
T1 Compute login request + 
SYN 
T10 Split the packet and 
verify 
T2 Encrypt T11 Drop the packet 
T3 Decrypt T12 Accept 
T4 Split the packet and verify T13 Compute ACK and 
session key 
T5 Drop the request T14 Encrypt ACK 
T6 Accept T15 Decrypt ACK 
T7 Compute SYN/ACK and 
session key 
T16 Split the packet and 
verify 
T8 Encrypt SYN/ACK T17 Drop the packet 

























In the trust model, the channels between C and S are 
depicted by interconnected arcs, which are attached to places.  
The exchange messages procedure is represented by tokens. 
Places represent storage for requests, messages, ciphers, or 
session keys. Transitions in the model describe particular 
functions or procedures, which may be performed while in an 
execution state. For example, the following events produce a 
new state: encryption, decryption, verification, and 
computations. Tokens are modelled in PN as shown in Fig. 2 
to represent the key agreement and message exchange 
between the client and server. During simulation, the token 
firing rule imitates the three-way handshake procedure.  The 
structure of a place linked to a transition represents a segment 
of serial processes performed by the entity to fulfil its role in 
the protocol run.  For instance, the transition T1 in Fig. 2 
consumes three tokens from P1, P2, and P3 to calculate the 
login request. The PN trust model represents a three-way 
handshake producer between C and S. It allows both C and S 
to agree on a shared session key over an insecure channel. The 
steps of protocol analysis for PN trust model are described as 
follows: 
• At first, the protocol is initiated by a client. The client 
entity of the PN trust model generates a random value 
(P1), Timestamp (P2), SYN request (P3) to compute the 
login request (P4) within a certain period of time. C sends 



































• Upon receiving the request, S will check the age of the 
token. Note that, computing and sending the request to S 
takes some units of time. S will drop the request if the 
time processing exceeds the deadline. This is guaranteed 
by the use of transport arcs that preserve the age of the 
tokens and the corresponding invariants.    
§ In the second message of the handshake, the server entity 
generates a random value (P10), timestamp (P11) to 
compute the session key (P12), and SYN/ACK request 
(P13). Then S sends the encrypted SYN/ACK (P14) to C. 
• Upon receiving SYN/ACK, C checks the token age and 
computes the session key (P19). At this stage, C 
authenticates S and sends an enciphered ACK (P21) to S. 
• Finally, the server entity checks the token age and 
authenticates C.  
 
 
IV. TRUST MODEL WITH ADVERSARY MODELLED VIA PN 
The purpose of this analysis is to find weaknesses and flaws 
in the proposed protocol. It is essential to examine the 
behaviour of the protocol with the presence of a malicious 
adversary. An adversary entity can be a hacker, a malicious 

















The worst-case scenario would be if attackers obtained 
illegitimate access to the target system. They could install 
malicious software, like a rootkit, to remove or modify data. 
This act of unauthorised access could lead to privilege 
escalation and allow the attacker to gain elevated entry to 
resources that are meant to be protected from other application 
users.  Moreover, faulty protocols may allow an attacker to 
compromise other machines in the network to act as zombie 
computers to launch denial-of-service attacks.  
PN modelling is capable of mapping out how messages 
flow throughout the protocol with an adversary. A high-level 
view of the adversary model with information flow is shown 
in Fig. 3.  
The adversary entity is composed of processes, each 
designed for a specific function in the protocol. Each process 
models the adversary’s possible actions to capture tokens. It 
can intercept messages from the channel, alter them, and pass 
them to the target source.  
Conceptually, the adversary entity is nondeterministic, in 
that it may perform different possible actions under different 
client identities at a given time to ultimately compromise the 
target system. The following assumptions are considered for 
the adversary model: 
1) The adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, and store 
messages. It may block or pass any of these 
messages. Additionally, it may construct forged 
messages from captured data and inject them into the 
channel. 
2) The adversary has zero knowledge such that it does 
not possess any elements of messages transmitted 
between the legitimate nodes but it can learn by 
observing the traffic. 
3) The traffic between client and server is not encrypted.  
The main goal of the adversary model is to examine the 
protocol behaviour with the presence of an adversary while 
modelling attacks. In the adversary model (attack model), the 
description of client and server entities is similar to the trust 
model descried in section 3. For adversary entity, places 
represent an adversary database, which store, control, 













Transitions represent a set of input events and commands the 
adversary may perform to launch an attack. The input token in 
the adversary entity indicates that the message has been 
captured. The token movement from place to place through 
the directed arcs indicates the progress of an attack. To 
distinguish a genuine traffic from forged traffic, the grave 
symbol ` is used to indicate that the variable could be 
modified. For example, if the adversary intercepts the message 
[A, B, C], the output message would be [A`, B`, C`], which 
means the message has been manipulated by the adversary. 
 
A. Analysis of Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
After adding an adversary entity to the model, it can be 
noticed that there is the possibility of a man-in-the-middle 
between the two entities C and S. An active adversary A can 
intercept the communication line between a legitimate client 
and a trusted server as well as manipulate the protocol by 
using some means to successfully masquerade either as server 
or client. The attack model in Fig. 4 represents the man-in-the-
middle attack for the proposed protocol. The definitions of the 
places and transitions used in this model are illustrated in 
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. 
Table 5. DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS - MAN-IN-THE-
MIDDLE ATTACK MODEL 
Trans. Definition Trans. Definition 
T1 Compute login request  T13 Send forge SYN/ACK 
 + SYN T14 Receive forge SYN/ACK 
T2 Send MSG T15 Split the packet and verify 
T3 Intercept MSG T16 Drop the request 
T4 Duplicate MSG T17 Accept 
T5 Send forge MSG T18 Compute ACK and  
T6 Received Forge MSG  session key 
T7 Split the packet and  T19 Send ACK 
 verify T20 Intercept MSG 
T8 Drop the request T21 Send forge ACK 
T9 Accept T22 Receive forge ACK 
T10 Compute SYN/ACK  T23 Split the packet and verify 
 and session key T24 Drop the request 
T11 Send SYN/ACK T25 Accept 
T12 Intercept MSG   
 
Server Adversary Client 
Figure 3. High-level view of adversary entity attacking the protocol 




























According to Fig. 4 the man-in-the-middle attack proceeds as 
follows: 
• In the login phase, when the client C initiates and sends 
the login request (P4) to the server S, an adversary A may 
intercept the login message. Transition T3 represents the 
initial phase of the attack. A can duplicate the login 
message and then start two sessions with S by sending 
two copies of request: P7 = P8 = [ID`C, T`C, W`1, M`3, 
MAC`k(IDC, TC, W1 ,M3)] to S.  
• Upon receiving (P11) and (P12), S generates two random 
numbers and two timestamps and computes the following:  
o Two session keys (P18, P19) for A and C, 
respectively 
o Two SYN/ACK messages (P20, P21) for A 
and C, respectively  
Then, S sends the messages (P22, P23) for the two sessions 
respectively.  
• In the meantime, A captures (P22, P23) and sends a forged 
message (P25) to C.  
• After receiving the (P27), C verifies it, which in this case 
is a genuine request [IDC, TS, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDC, TS, 
W2, M6, M7)]. Consequently, C authenticates A 
masquerading as S. Then C computes the shared session 









































Place Definition Place Definition 
P1 Client random number P22 Sent SYN/ACK for A 
P2 Client timestamp P23 Sent SYN/ACK for C 
P3 SYN request P24 Received SYN/ACK for C 
P4 Login request P25 Received SYN/ACK for A 
P5 Sent request  P26 Sent forge SYN/ACK to C 
P6 Intercepted MSG P27 Received forge SYN/ACK 
P7 Forge MSG A P28 Verification message 
P8 Forge MSG C P29 Rejected request 
P9 Sent forge MSG A P30 Accept request – A is  
P10 Sent forge MSG C  authenticated 
P11 Received forge MSG A P31 Session key 
P12 Received forge MSG A P32 ACK 
P13 Verification message P33 Sent ACK 
P14 Rejected request P34 Intercepted ACK 
P15 Accepted request P35 Forge ACK 
P16 Server random number P36 Received forge ACK 
P17 Server timestamp P37 Verification message 
P18 A Session Key P38 Rejected request 
P19 C Session key P39 Accept request – A is  
P20 SYN/ACK for A  authenticated 
P21 SYN/ACK for C   
Server Adversary Client 
Figure 4. Modelling man-in-the-middle attack 
 • A intercepts (P32) and forwards it to S. 
• After receiving (P36), S verifies ACK= H4(M6⊕rS). Thus, 
A is successfully authenticated by S masquerading C. 
 
   By analysing the protocol, without encrypting the traffic, the 
proposed protocol is prone to man-in-the-middle attack. The 
adversary has the ability to control the negotiation between the 
client and the server. In fact, the adversary can clearly modify, 
substitute or delete all subsequent messages. It is obvious that 
both the client and the server have established a bogus session 
with the adversary.  
 
B. Analysis of Reflection Attack 
The reflection attack consists of two parties. The 
adversary in this model is masquerading as the server. In this 
PN model, places represent either input or output of protocol 
run. Transitions are used to explicit the client and adversary 
actions. Tokens indicate the progress of the attack. Fig. 4 
describes the execution of a reflection attack for the proposed 
protocol with presence of the client and adversary. The 
definitions of the places and the transitions used in this model 

























Table 7. DEFINITIONS OF PLACES - THE REFLECTION 
ATTACK MODEL 
Table 8. DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS - REFLECTION 
ATTACK MODEL 
Trans. Definition Trans. Definition 
T1 Compute login request  T7 Split the packet and verify 
 and SYN T8 Drop the request 
T2 Send MSG T9 Accept the request 
T3 Intercept MSG T10 Compute ACK and  
T4 Fabricate SYN/ACK  session key 
T5 Send fake SYN/ACK T11 Send ACK 
T6 Received fake  T12 Receive ACK 
























Place Definition Place Definition 
P1 Client random number P9 Received forge SYN/ACK 
P2 Client timestamp P10 Verification message 
P3 SYN request P11 Rejected request 
P4 Login request P12 Accepted request 
P5 Sent request  P13 Session key 
P6 Intercepted MSG P14 ACK 
P7 Sent forge SYN/ACK P15 Sent ACK 
P8 Received forge 
SYN/ACK 
P16 Received ACK 
Adversary Client 
Figure 5. Modelling reflection attack 
 Since client C’s login request  [IDC, TC, W1, M3, 
MACk(IDC, TC, W1 ,M3)] is symmetrical to server S response 
[IDC, TS, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDC, TS, W2, M6, M7)] but the 
differences between them can be only found in the timestamps 
and hash values. This symmetry flaw leads to reflection attack. 
To exploit the reflection attack, the adversary A intercepts the 
login request while listening to the electronic conversation 
between client C and server S. Then, the adversary sends the 
same login request [ID`C, T`C, W`1, M`3, MAC`k(IDC, TC, W1 
,M3)] to C in a timely manner.  
It is obvious that, upon receiving the forged server’s 
response (which is in fact the adversary’s reply request), C 
will automatically acknowledge the response since the 
computation is accomplished with the correct key, so the 
MAC integrity check will succeed. Consequently, A 
successfully masquerades as S and the protocol fails to 
provide mutual authentication.  
Although, A can cheat C into believing it is 
communicating with S, A cannot obtain the corresponding 
session key sk. Still this type of attack is deemed to represent a 
breach of the basic obligation of mutual authentication with 
limited damage.  A performed the exploit without the 
knowledge of key k, merely by intercepting the challenge and 
sending it back to C. 
 
C. Analysis of Parallel Session Attack 
Another attack, which is effective against the proposed 
model without encrypted traffic, is parallel session attack. This 
attack uses deception to compromise authentication protocols. 
It involves selecting a valid combination of information from 
ongoing protocol executions. Fig. 6 explains the exploitation of 
parallel session attack on the proposed protocol with presence 
of adversary. The message exchange in this attack is mainly 
between the server and the adversary leaving the client 
completely out of the picture. The definitions of the places and 
the transitions for this model are defined in Table 9 and Table 
10, respectively. 
Table 9. DEFINITIONS OF PLACES - PARALLEL SESSION 
ATTACK MODEL 
 
Table 10. DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS - PARALLEL 
SESSION ATTACK MODEL 
Trans. Definition Trans. Definition 
T1 Compute login request  T10 Send SYN/ACK 
 + SYN T11 Intercept MSG 
T2 Send MSG T12 Fabricate SYN 
T3 Intercept MSG T13 Send fake SYN 
T4 Send forge MSG T14 Receive forge SYN 
T5 Received Forge MSG T15 Split the packet and verify 
T6 Split the packet and  T16 Drop the request 
 verify T17 Accept 
T7 Drop the request T18 Compute SYN/ACK and  
T8 Accept  session key 
T9 Compute SYN/ACK  T19 Send SYN/ACK 
 and session key T20 Receive SYN/ACK 
     In the authentication phase of the proposed protocol, the 
adversary A can masquerade as an authorised client without 
prior knowledge of the password or biometric data. The 
exploit starts when A eavesdrops on the communication 
between C and S. A intercepts and blocks the S response 
message: P16 = [IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2, 
M6, M7)]. Then, A instantly impersonates C and initiates a new 
session with S by sending a fabricated login request: P19 = 
[IDA =ID`C , TA = T`S, W1=W`2, M3 = M`6, M7, MAC`k(IDC, 
TS, W2, M6, M7)], which is S original reply to C. 
Assume if the fabricated message arrives to S at time T, it will 
pass the verification check for the following reasons: 
(1) The likelihood of correlation associated with T –̀ TC ≤ 
∆T will be high considering the time-delay in wide-
area networks is unpredictable and varies most of the 
time. Thus, ∆T is often set higher than the timespan 
of a complete round-trip [16-18] 
(2) The MAC integrity check will give a positive result 
since MAC`k(IDC, TS, W2, M6, M7) is actually 
computed with the correct key k by S. 
Based on the above assumptions, S generates random 
number P24 and timestamp P25 to computes session key P26 
and SYN/ACK response P28, and sends it to A.  
 
 
D. Analysis of Impersonation Attack 
One possible attack against the proposed model is 
impersonation attack. Based on the simulation of man-in-the-
middle attack, reflection attack, and parallel session attack, the 
model reveals a potential risk and weakness that lead to 
impersonation attack. The adversary A can mount 
impersonation attack without knowing any other secret 
information or credentials by intercepting the login request 
[IDC, TC, W1, M3, MACk(IDC, TC, W1 ,M3)]. Hence, A can 
exploit the proposed protocol by using any of the methods 
explained previously and hijacking sessions transmitted 
between C and S. Eventually, A succeeds to impersonating 




Place Definition Place Definition 
P1 Client random number P16 Sent SYN/ACK  
P2 Client timestamp P17 Received SYN/ACK 
P3 SYN request P18 Fabricated Fake SYN 
P4 Login request P19 Sent fake SYN 
P5 Sent request  P20 Received fake SYN 
P6 Intercepted MSG P21 Verification message 
P7 Forge MSG  P22 Rejected request 
P8 Sent Forge MSG  P23 Accepted request 
P9 Verification message P24 Server random number 
P10 Rejected request P25 Server timestamp 
P11 Accepted request P26 Session Key 
P12 Server random number P27 SYN/ACK 
P13 Server timestamp P28 Sent SYN/ACK 
P14 Session Key P29 Received SYN/ACK 

























V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
     Security analysis is a crucial significant process in 
evaluating communication and cryptographic protocols. The 
flaws within the protocol can be quickly removed via two 
solutions. First, encrypting the traffic between client and 
server creates a private channel to transmit a confidential 
conversation and calculate the session key. This mechanism is 
the most cost-effective solution. It is insignificant if the 
adversary gets hold of an encrypted form of sensitive data as 
long as it does not obtain the corresponding decryption key. In 
the second solution, the absence of server identity allows an 
adversary to simply masquerade as a trusted server. It is 
possible to optimise the protocol with a simple technique such 
as adding the server IDS, which can fix the problem. 
Encrypting traffic protects client’s anonymity; user anonymity 
is one of the security features of remote login system. 
     Variations of these attacks can be modelled in all phases of 
mutual authentication and key agreement of cycle. Modelling 
and simulation revealed that the unencrypted traffic does not 
provide a full secure authentication and permit a sensitive 







Replay Attack. The security feature in the proposed 
protocol can withstand replay attack due to the use of 
freshness property. This is guaranteed by applying timestamps 
and random numbers for each authentication session. To 
validate the authenticity of messages exchanged between C 
and S, the freshness of timestamps is constantly checked. For 
example, the verification request will fail if T –̀ TC > ∆T. This 
will cause the session to be terminated. Moreover, a new 
session key is constructed in every authentication cycle. It is 
worth to mentioning that, the adversary cannot compromise 
the old session key because it is never been transmitted in the 
protocol execution between the client and the server. One of 
the new protocol merits is that each entity computes the 
correct session key based on the information exchanged 
between them. 
Forgery Attack. The adversary A cannot create a valid 
login from scratch without knowing the secret value and the 
private key of the client. Thus, the adversary cannot act as a 
legal client so the attack is not feasible.   
 
Figure 6. Modelling parallel session attack 
Client	   Adversary Server	  
 VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents a formal approach for enumerating the 
vulnerabilities and flaws in our protocol and determining 
suitable countermeasures to fix them. First, PN is used to 
model the client-server trust model. Then, an adversary entity 
is added to trust model to analyse various attacks and 
understand possible behaviours of the adversary. Each attack 
scenario has been simulated using PN to exploits 
vulnerabilities in case if the symmetric encryption was not 
applied to our new protocol.  
Adding an adversary to the model encourages discovering 
and discussing scenarios where the system was under 
malicious attack. The range of attacks tested the behaviour of 
the protocol and helped to understand possible behaviours of 
the adversary during attacks. Each attack scenario has been 
simulated using PN to exploits vulnerabilities in case if the 
symmetric encryption was not applied to our new protocol.  
It is evident that the most viable countermeasure to defend 
authentication attacks is to encrypt the message exchange 
between the client and server. Since the traffic is encrypted 
between the client and server, this proves that our new 
protocol is resistant to man-in-the-middle attack, reflection 
attack, parallel session attack, and impersonation attack. Also, 
this paper shows that replay attack and forgery attack are not 
effective because of the freshness property and the difficulty 
of creating a login request without learning any prior 
credentials. This analysis shows that our protocol is efficient 
and provides secure communication over insecure channels. 
Future work will include examining ciphertext attack where 
the adversary can eavesdrop and intercept encrypted 
messages. PN will be used for modelling and simulating the 
attack. Once the security analysis is completed, any 
modification will be considered to enhance our protocol, such 
as including server ID in the protocol. Consequently a 
complex client-server trust model will be simulated and 
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